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Summary
This book comprises an analysis of the function of the board of supervisory directors within
corporations. This analysis is based on the study of relevant literature, interviews with supervisory
directors and on the experiences of the author in his capacity of accountant (and with that, of
advisor to various boards of managing and supervisory directors).
ln chapter one, a description is given of the responsibilities and authorities of supervisory direc-
tors, based on the relevant legislation. In the Netherlands, the boards of managing and supervisory
directors operate in a "two tier structure". This means that there is a fbrrnal segregation between
the boald of managing directors (also referred to as "management" or "executive board") on the
one hand and the board of supervisory directors (also known as "supervisory board") on the other.
As defined by law, the function of a supervisory director is to use the best interest of the corpora-
tion as the basis of his actions and conduct. The responsibilities of the board of supervisory
directors comprise the supervision of and the provision of advice to the board of managing direc-
tors. The best interest of the corporation is not necessarily synonymous to the best interest of the
shareholders. What it actually constitutes has, however, never been fbrmally defined. The concepts
of supervision and provision of advice are in dire need of a clear definition.
For certain large corporations, the formation of a board of supervisory directors is legally requi-
red, and its authorities are defined by law. This is what is known as the large (structure) corporati-
on rule. The n-rembers of the supervisory directory board of a large public corporation are appoin-
ted by the board of supervisory directols itself. The general meeting of shareholdels and the works
council are entitled to nominate candidates and to formally object to the appointment of candidates
(control Ied co-optation).
In chapter ttuo, the issue of corporate governance is addressed. Here, corporate governance is to
be interpreted as "the process of the influence exerted by interesled parties on the business activi-
ties of conrpanies both in telms of decision-making and the implementation of said decisions". The
interests of various categories of stakeholders are discussed, as well as the limitations of the
influence rninority shareholders have on policy. Furthermore, the interests of suppliers of interest-
bearing loans are discussed. as well as those of trade creditors. employees and other stakeholders.
An analysis of the function of the board of supervisory directors would be impossible without
taking standards for governance into consideration. Such consideration is paid to this subject in
clnpter three, in which decision-nraking, inrplementation and accountability are addressed. Aspects
which ale discussed are risk policies, the weighing of longterm objectives against short-term
goals, and the degree to which the interests of "weaker constituencies", such as employees and
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suppliers in Third World countries, are considerations. Responsibilities with regard to envlronmen-
la l  issues are also addressed.
In chapter four, the practical content of supervision is outlined. Firstly, the issue of internal
controls is addressed. The function of supervisory directors is analyzed on the basis of the con-
cepts of decision management and decision control (Fama and Jensen, 1983a). This analysis leads
to a definition of the boundaries of the responsibilities and authorities of the board of supervisory
directors. Secondly, methods of supervision are discussed, as well as the information requirements
of the board of supervisory directors and the practical limitations to supervision.
Additionally, this chapter addresses possible conflicts of interest which could arise from other
functions of certain supervisory directors, such as shareholder, supplier of credit and/or trade
partner to the company. Finally, the factors which are crucial to the effectiveness of supervision
by the board are outlined.
ln chapterfive, the questionnaire methodology is outlined. Phone interviews were conducted with
43 chairmen of supervisory directory boards of large companies. These interviewees have practical
experience on several boards of supervisory directors. The supervisory directors interviewed for
this examination represent 22 of rbe 25 major listed companies (ranked according to market
capitalization), whereby the interviewee qualifies as "representative" if he is a member of the
board of supervisory directors of one or more of these companies.
The theses posed to the interviewees concern the functions of a supervisory director. In conside-
ring their answers, the main criterion was to be what they considered to be best practice.
Chapter.l,r focuses on the segregation of duties at top level. The segregation of duties as used by
Fama and Jensen (1983a) turn out to be applicable to the segregation of duties between manage-
ment and the supervisory directory board. According to the majority of the interviewees, supervi-
sory directors are not to be involved on the executive side, nor with planning. As they say the
restrict themselves to supervision and the provision of advice.
Chapter seuen addresses possible conflicts of interest. The majority of interviewees do not consider
the combined function of supervisory director/shareholder to be problematic. The combined
functions of supervisory director/client and supervisory director/banker are rejected as being
conflicting, albeit that many interviewees admit to condoning the latter type of functional combina-
tions, given the degree of expertise among certain bankers. A proper segregation of duties within
the bank is also advocated. (The interviewees also advocate a segregation of duties within instituti-
onal shareholders which are represented by a supervisory director.)
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From these answers, it can be deduced that the function of supervisory director is generally
considered to be unsuitable tbr the representation of specific vested iDterests.
In chapter eight, tbe infbrmation requirements are discussed. The interviewees consider the
supervisory directory board to be autonomous in the wording of its own infbrmation requirements.
The interviewees unanimously consider information concerning risks and exposures to be part of
these requirements, including an assessment of potential losses and damages.
ln chapter nine. the limits to the function are addressed. The interviewees express that it is the
function of the board of supervisory directors to supervise, but that the nleans required to do so
are oiten unavailable. For instance, the interviewees generally comment on the problems of
detecting and identifying inefficiencies. They also feel it is practically impossible to prevent the
executive board from taking on commitments the company cannot keep.
The majority of the supervisory directors interviewed f'eel that they are obliged to see to it that the
executive board does not misuse its position. The majority also agrees that the supervisory direc-
tors should see to it that nranagememt uses a system of internal controls aimed at the prcvention of
such abuse of position by employees.
Chapter ren discusses the weighing of interests. Frorn this, it appears that supervisory directors
particularly stress the importance of aspects such as continuity and the keeping of commitments by
the company. The supervisory directors interviewed generally do not consider themselves to be the
safekeepers of the shareholders' interests. Profitability and continuity do, however, r'ank high in
their Iist of priorities. For ntost interviewees, forced lay-oft\ are considered to be a legitimate
option if necessary fbr the improvement of profltability.
Chapter e/everl concerns the social responsibilities of supervisory directors. Compliance to legisla-
tion and regulations and the preservation of continuity turn out to be the most important guidelines
in this respect. However, several otlrer considerations are mentioned. For instance, the intervie-
wees may consider environn.rental pollution of Third World countries to be unacceptable. regard-
less of the quality of local legisiation and law enforcement.
ln chapter tu,elve, the option of interim resignation is discussed. From the answers, it can be
deduced that supervisory directors will generally use this option as a last resort only. Staying on
for the full term and thus using one's vote and efforts to influence the board's decisions seems to
be the preferred option by far. 'Ihe supervisory directory board clearly does not perceive its
funclion to be the "hallmark" ol the nranasement board's conduct.
ln chapter thirteen, the diil 'erent interpretations of the function within various types of companies
are sunmrarized. Several comments by supervisory directors from Dutch systems are also included.
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ht chapter fourteen' the possible influence oF a stock exchange Iisting on the supervisory director,s
interpretation of his function is briefly discussed. It appears fiom the questionnaire that intervie-
wees with a more extensive experience in listed companles assrgn nlore rmportance to the interests
of suppliers of capital than those rvith less experience in risted comDanies.
In chapter ftfteeil, the conclusions from the questionnaire are discussed. The consequences of the
high degree of importance the supervisory directors assign to the interests of the suppliers of loan
capital are discussed in more detail here- A<Jditionally. this chapter includes some comments by the
author on supervision within large (structure) corporations and, in particular, its porential benefits
for suppliers of loan capital.
